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ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME COMES OF AGE:
THE EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY SCHEME
David M. Uhlmann*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 often is considered the first
environmental criminal statute because it contains strict liability provisions that
make it a misdemeanor to discharge refuse into navigable waters of the United
States without a permit.' When Congress passed the Rivers and Harbors Act,
however, it was far more concerned with preventing interference with interstate
commerce than environmental protection. For practical purposes, the
environmental crimes program in the United States dates to the development of the
modem environmental regulatory system during the 1970s, and amendments to the
environmental laws during the 1980s, which upgraded criminal violations of the
environmental laws from misdemeanors to felonies.2
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1 The discharge prohibition of the Rivers and Harbor Act of 1899 is known as the
Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006), violations of which are misdemeanors under 33
U.S.C. § 411. The misdemeanor provisions of the Rivers and Harbor Act overlap to a
significant degree with the criminal provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(commonly referred to as the "Clean Water Act"), id. §§ 1251-1387, but contain three
notable distinctions. First, the Rivers and Harbors Act only covers discharges into
navigable-in-fact waters; the Clean Water Act extends to all waters of the United States.
Compare id. § 407 (applicable specifically to "navigable waters"), with id. § 1362(7)
(defining "navigable waters" as "waters of the United States"). Second, the Rivers and
Harbors Act covers discharges from all sources; the Clean Water Act largely is limited to
point source discharges. Compare id. § 407 (covering discharges from "any ship, barge, or
other floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or
mill of any kind") with id. § 1362(12) (defining "discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source"). Third, the Rivers and Harbors
Act does not cover sewage discharges, but the Clean Water Act regulates sewage. Compare
id. §- 407 (excluding refuse "flowing from . . . sewers") with id. § 1362(6) (including
"sewage" in the definition of "pollutant").
2 See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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The enactment and amendments of the federal Clean Air Act, the Clean Water
Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act ("CERCLA"), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")
during the 1970s and 1980s brought more than the birth of the environmental
crimes program in the United States. 3 For the first time, storage or disposal of
hazardous waste without a permit or the discharge of pollutants into waters of the
United States without a permit was a felony under federal law.4 Waste
management practices that had been legal for decades, and which were standard
operating procedures for businesses across America, suddenly could give rise to
felony prosecution if committed "knowingly" by corporations and their employees.
As a result, the 1980s brought a series of "firsts" for environmental criminal
enforcement: the first felony prosecutions under each of the major environmental
laws, the first knowing endangerment cases, 5 and the first jail sentences imposed
for environmental crime under the federal sentencing guidelines. In the 1990s, the
"firsts" continued as indictments and then trials occurred in federal judicial
districts where there had never been environmental crimes prosecutions.
The development of the environmental crimes program involved significant
growing pains as federal prosecutors and Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") criminal investigators struggled to define their respective roles, and
Congress investigated claims that political appointees at the Justice Department
were interfering with environmental prosecutions.6 As those .issues subsided,
judges, defense attorneys, and academics raised questions about the role of
criminal enforcement under the environmental laws.
Some critics questioned whether criminal enforcement was appropriate for
violations of statutes and regulations that often are mind-numbingly complex.7
3 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006); Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (2006); Clean Air Act, id. §§ 7401-7671;
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, id. §§ 9601-
9675 (2006).
4 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2006) (criminalizing the discharge of a pollutant in
violation of the Clean Water Act).
5 The crime of knowing endangerment occurs if a defendant commits a substantive
violation of the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act, or RCRA and "knows at that time that
he thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury ...."
Id. § 1319(c)(3)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (2006); see also id. § 7413(c)(5)(A) (using
slightly different language).
6 See William T. Hassler, Congressional Oversight of Federal Environmental
Prosecutions: The Trashing of Environmental Crimes, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10074 (1994);
Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection Into Legal Rules and the
Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 867, 868-75 (1994); Judson W.
Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental Criminal
Prosecutions and the Work That Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 900, 902-12 (1991).
7 See Kevin A. Gaynor et al., Environmental Criminal Prosecutions: Simple Fixes
for a Flawed System, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 25-27 (1992); Timothy Lynch, Polluting Our
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Others raised concerns that the mental state requirements for environmental crimes
were minimal and bordered on strict liability,8 particularly when corporate officials
were prosecuted under the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine for
environmental crimes.9 Advocates of criminal enforcement responded that the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion would filter out cases that were too technical or
where evidence of criminal intent was weak.10 Nonetheless, commentators
protested that the criminal provisions of the environmental laws were too broad,
and that Congress had delegated too much authority to prosecutors to decide which
environmental violations were criminal."
A common theme of the complaints raised during the 1980s and 1990s about
environmental prosecutions was the absence of a meaningful basis for determining
what makes an environmental case criminal. In most instances, the act requirement
for a criminal prosecution under the environmental laws involves the same conduct
that could give rise to civil or administrative enforcement. 12 In terms of statutory
elements, the only additional proof required in a criminal prosecution is that the
defendant acted with the requisite mental state,1 3 which many critics argued was a
minimal showing.)4 In all other respects, the same conduct could give rise to
criminal, civil, or administrative enforcement, all at the whim of the investigating
agency or prosecuting office.
Principles: Environmental Prosecutions and the Bill of Rights, 15 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 161, 165-71, 177-83 (1996).
8 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal". Reflections on the
Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 210-13
(1991); R. Christopher Locke, Environmental Crimes: The Absence of "Intent" and the
Complexities of Compliance, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 311, 320-21 (1991).
9 See Michael C. Ford, Reconciling Environmental Liability Standards After Iverson
and Bestfoods, 30 ENV'T REP. 229, 231-33 (1999); Keith A. Onsdorff & James M.
Mesnard, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in RCRA Criminal Enforcement:
What You Don 't Know Can Hurt You, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 10099, 10102-04 (1992).
'Kathleen F. Brickey, The Rhetoric of Environmental Crime: Culpability,
Discretion, and Structural Reform, 84 IOWA L. REV. 115, 125-35 (1998).
" Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demand of Integration in the Evolution of
Environmental Law. Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2487
(1995). Professor Lazarus's article produced a spirited exchange with the Justice
Department. See Lois J. Schiffer & James F. Simon, The Reality of Prosecuting
Environmental Criminals: A Response to Professor Lazarus, 83 GEO. L.J. 2531 (1995) and
Richard J. Lazarus, The Reality of Environmental Law in the Prosecution of Environmental
Crimes: A Reply to the Department of Justice, 83 GEO. L.J. 2539 (1995). For further
discussion, see Brickey, supra note 10.
12 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(a)-(c) (2006) (allowing the government to pursue
administrative, civil, or criminal enforcement for violations of the Clean Water Act).
13 See id. §§ 1319(c)(l)-(2) (requiring a "negligent" or "knowing" mental state for
criminal prosecutions).
14 See Coffee, supra note 8, at 217.
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In the last decade, the environmental crimes program has thrived. The number
of environmental prosecutors grew during the Bush administration, even as other
environmental protection efforts faltered, and a consensus emerged that significant
environmental violations may warrant criminal enforcement. 15 As with other
regulatory schemes, 16 criminal enforcement of environmental violations promotes
compliance and deters violations because it is more difficult for companies to treat
criminal prosecutions as a "cost of doing business." Corporations that are
criminally prosecuted may lose lucrative government contracts and incur damage
to their public (and commercial) images, in addition to paying criminal fines,
serving probationary terms, and facing other sanctions. 7 Corporate officials can be
criminally prosecuted and face possible incarceration, which may provide a greater
deterrent than the threat of either criminal or civil fines imposed against the
corporation. Yet despite the potential benefits of criminal enforcement, the
historical criticism of environmental prosecution occasionally resurfaces, 18 and the
question of what makes an environmental case criminal remains unanswered.
This Article will reconsider concerns about the role of criminal enforcement
under the environmental laws and suggest an answer to the question of what makes
an environmental case criminal. Part II examines the "act" requirement and the
extent to which the environmental laws focus on conduct that may raise issues for
criminal enforcement. Part III addresses mental state requirements under the
environmental laws and argues that the "knowingly" requirement is not a reduced
mental state, although its application in the environmental context may present
challenges. Part IV evaluates the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in
environmental cases and suggests that criminal prosecution should be reserved for
cases involving (1) significant harm or risk of harm to the environment or public
health, (2) deceptive or misleading conduct, (3) deliberate efforts to operate
outside the environmental regulatory system, or (4) significant and repetitive
violations of environmental laws. Part V concludes that the proper exercise of
'5 See David M. Uhlmann, Strange Bedfellows, ENVTL. F., May-June 2008, at 40-43
(analyzing the paradoxical growth of the environmental crimes program during the Bush
Administration).
16 See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, Prosecuting Worker Endangerment: The Need for
Stronger Criminal Penalties for Violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
ADVANCE: J. ACS ISSUE GROUPS, Spring 2009, at 191, 195-98.
17 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2006) (prohibiting federal agencies from entering,
contracts with any person convicted of a criminal violation under the Clean Water Act until
the EPA Administrator certifies that the condition giving rise to the violation has been
corrected).
18 See, e.g., Nathaniel D. Shafer, Environmental Crimes, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 471,
538 (2009) ("RCRA's minimal knowledge requirements impose near strict liability on
corporate officers."); cf J.T. Morgan, The Mythical Erosion of Mens Rea, 23 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 29, 29 (2009) (characterizing claims about the erosion of mens rea in
the prosecution of environmental crimes as greatly exaggerated).
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prosecutorial discretion delineates an appropriate role for criminal enforcement
under the environmental laws.
II. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL VIOLATIONS
AND THE "ACT" REQUIREMENT
Congress included criminal provisions in each of the major environmental
laws when they were enacted during the 1970s. 19 Initially, the criminal provisions
were misdemeanors, 20 and there were relatively few prosecutions. First, the laws
were new, and the legal norms they created were not sufficiently well established
to justify criminal enforcement, except in the most egregious cases. Second,
federal prosecutors and investigators rarely prosecute misdemeanors, instead
devoting their limited resources to the matters that Congress has deemed most
significant by making them felonies.2'
The number of criminal prosecutions increased significantly during the 1980s
and 1990s, after Congress amended the environmental statutes and elevated most
environmental crimes to felonies.22 The 1984 RCRA amendments created felonies
for knowingly treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste without a permit
from the EPA or an authorized state and for knowingly transporting hazardous
waste without a manifest or to a facility that was not authorized to receive
hazardous waste.23 The 1987 Clean Water Act amendments included felony
provisions for knowingly discharging pollutants from a point source into waters of
the United States without a permit or in violation of a permit, for knowingly
making a false statement on a discharge monitoring report (DMR), and for
knowingly tampering with or rendering inaccurate a Clean Water Act monitoring
method.24 The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments contained numerous felony
provisions, the most significant of which historically has been the knowing release
19 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
21 See Uhlmann, supra note 16, at 198-99. This article focuses on federal
prosecutions under the environmental laws, which account for the overwhelming majority
of environmental criminal cases prosecuted in the United States.
22 The Clean Water Act continues to include misdemeanor provisions for negligently
discharging pollutants into waters of the United States without a permit. See 33 U.S.C. §
1319(c)(1) (2006). The Clean Air Act contains a misdemeanor provision for negligent
endangerment. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4) (2006). The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2615 (2006), and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7
U.S.C. § 1361 (2006), also include misdemeanor provisions. Most environment
prosecutions, however, are felony cases under RCRA, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean
Air Act.
23 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1984).
24 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2), (c)(4) (1987).
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of hazardous air pollutants in violation of National Emissions Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs).2 5
The criminalization of environmental violations presents challenges
conceptually in at least two ways. First, as with other forms of regulatory crime,
the moral content of the proscribed conduct is not as well established as it is for
common law crime, which has prompted concerns about overcriminalization.
Second, the complexity of environmental law raises issues about whether it can be
integrated effectively with traditional approaches to criminal liability. This Part
addresses each of these issues in turn.
A. The Morality of Environmental Crime
The inclusion of criminal provisions in the environmental laws and the
subsequent elevation of those crimes to felony status highlighted the seismic shift
in pollution control law that accompanied creation of the federal environmental
regulatory scheme. When Congress passed the environmental laws, it asserted
federal jurisdiction over a wide array of commercial activities that previously were
the exclusive province of state law. In addition, by making violations of those laws
subject to criminal prosecution, Congress criminalized conduct that previously had
been legal and accepted practice in most states.
The criminalization of environmental violations continued a broader trend
toward using criminal sanctions to prohibit acts that previously were legal. A
threshold concern about criminalization is that individuals may lack sufficient
notice that their conduct is prohibited, especially during the years immediately
following the creation of "new" crimes. These fairness issues had the potential to
be particularly significant for environmental crime because Congress
simultaneously authorized a new environmental regulatory scheme and established
criminal sanctions for violations of those new regulations. The underlying
regulations were not promulgated until after notice and comment from the
regulated community, however, and significant criminal enforcement did not occur
until environmental crimes became felonies in the 1980s, a decade after enactment
of the environmental laws.
A more fundamental concern about criminalization is that it may extend the
criminal law beyond its proper role. Long before the 1970s, scholars debated the
dangers of "overcriminalization. ' '26 Some scholars argued that undue reliance on
criminal prohibitions undermines the legitimacy of the criminal sanction by
25 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (1990). In recent years, the EPA and the Justice Department
have begun focusing on other Clean Air Act crimes, but asbestos cases remain the largest
category of Clean Air Act prosecutions.
26 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401,415-25 (1958); Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal
Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 423, 435-49 (1963);
Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 78-88 (1933).
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reducing, if not eliminating, its moral underpinning.27 They posited that the
criminal law only should be invoked for morally reprehensible conduct.28 Other
scholars, including sociologists, countered that the criminal law provides
techniques to achieve social ends, not necessarily dependent upon prevailing
notions of morality.29 In addition, to the extent that moral considerations are
relevant, they argued that moral culpability and blameworthiness evolve over time
within communities.3 °
Since the 1970s, the overcriminalization debate has continued,31 fueled by the
expansion of the regulatory state and the fact that Congress has been quick to
create criminal laws in response to temporary social or political upheaval.32 To
some extent, the overcriminalization debate now involves more than different
perspectives about the role of morality in the criminal law; the discussion also
reflects conflicting views about the role of the federal government and the exercise
of its regulatory authority. It therefore is not surprising that environmental crime is
cited as an example of overcriminalization.33 Critics of the expansion of federal
criminal law describe environmental violations as malum prohibitum (a prohibited
wrong), as opposed to malum in se (inherently wrongful), because the conduct had
been legal before the 1970s. They claim that environmental laws subject
"otherwise law-abiding" citizens to criminal prosecution for morally neutral
conduct.34
27 See Sayre, supra note 26, at 79-80; Kadish, supra note 26, at 435-40.
28 See Sayre, supra note 26, at 79-80.
29 See Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminol Sanctions in the
Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 210-14
(1965).
30 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1016 (1932).
31 See Coffee, supra note 8; Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54
AM. U. L. REV. 703 (2005); Paul S. Rosenzweig, The Over-Criminalization of Social and
Economic Conduct, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 7 (2003). For
contrary views in the context of regulatory crime, see John L. Diamond, The Myth of
Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 129 (1996)
(arguing in support of the expansion of so-called 'regulatory offenses'); Stuart P. Green,
Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral
Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1537 (1997) (arguing that a
misunderstanding of the role of morality in the criminal law has led to "miscalculation of
the extent to which overcriminalization is a problem").
32 The American Bar Association reported in 1998 that there were more than 3,300
separate federal crimes in the United States Code, nearly half of them enacted since the
1970s. Task Force on Federalization of Crim. Law, A.B.A., The Federalization of Criminal
Law, App. C (1998) (James A. Strazzella rptr.).
33 See Rosenzweig, supra note 31, at 11.
34 See Luna, supra note 31, at 709 (citing the imprisonment of a construction
supervisor for negligent supervision .of an employee who ruptured a pipeline with a
backhoe and the criminal conviction of a landowner for "moving sand onto his property
without a federal permit").
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A more nuanced view is that environmental crimes do not fit easily within the
common law distinctions between conduct that is malum in se and malum
prohibitum, in part because a wide range of conduct is considered environmental
crime. Pollution offenses, particularly those that result in harm to the environment
and/or public health, may have been malum in se from their inception.35 Congress
enacted the environmental laws at a time of significant environmental degradation
and widespread concern about pollution prevention.36 It therefore could be argued
that by the 1970s ecological concerns already had altered historical notions about
the wrongfulness of pollution. In other words, pollution may have been morally
wrong even before Congress made some pollution illegal.37
In contrast, paperwork offenses such as recordkeeping or failure to report
violations might be characterized as malum prohibitum. There was no underlying
duty to keep records or report discharges until Congress passed the environmental
laws. Yet even when a violation of the law is malum prohibitum, the conduct is
still wrongful (malum) and, inasmuch as the violation involves disobedience of the
law, the crime has moral content.38 In addition, malum prohibitum environmental
offenses may involve regulations that are as essential to effective environmental
protection as those implicated by environmental offenses that are malum in se. For
example, some reporting obligations enable the government to make permitting
decisions with the benefit of complete information about sources of pollution
activity; others enable the government to respond quickly to cleanup spills. Absent
compliance with those reporting obligations, the government might be limited in
its ability to prevent harmful pollution.
35 See Avi Samuel Garbow, The Federal Environmental Crimes Program: The Lorax
and Economics 101, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 54 (2001) (arguing that many environmental
crimes are malum in se).
36 See Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United States
Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law's First Three Decades in the
United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 76 (2001).
31 See Garbow, supra note 35. Susan Mandiberg observes that evaluating the moral
content of environmental violations is challenging because not all pollution is illegal. See
Susan F. Mandiberg, What Does an Environmental Criminal Know?, 23 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T 24, 24-25 (2009). For example, companies may obtain permits under the Clean
Water Act that authorize discharges (and hence pollution) as long as the discharges meet
permit limits. For this reason, it could be argued that permit violations are more malum
prohibitum than malum in se because it is the quantity or amount of the pollution that is
illegal. The decision that some pollution can be tolerated, however, involves a
determination that more than the proscribed amount would be harmful to the affected
ecosystem. Permit violations, in addition to the harm they may cause directly, upset the
delicate balance struck by permitting authorities in determining, for example, the waste
load allocation for a waterway (i.e., how much can be discharged while maintaining water
quality standards). As a result, permit violations undermine effective environmental
protection and may be considered wrongful much like other types of pollution.
38 See Green, supra note 31, at 1573-74 (quoting RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 9 (1977)).
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Moreover, overcriminalization arguments about environmental crime do not
account for the significant sociological changes that have occurred since the 1970s.
In the nearly forty years since Congress enacted the environmental laws, an
extensive waste management industry has developed. Environmental compliance
has become a professional field. Climate change and the deterioration of the global
environment have become pressing national and international concerns. In the
process, a new generation has come of age, and a new set of societal norms has
emerged, both emphasizing the need for greater stewardship of the environment
and internalizing the notion that pollution is inherently wrong.39
Heightened concern about environmental degradation does not resolve all
questions about the role of criminal enforcement under the environmental laws, as
will be discussed in greater detail in Parts III and IV. Nor does the passageof time
necessarily eliminate the challenges presented by the creation of new crimes.
(Congress could create criminal provisions that never gain societal acceptance, as
occurred during Prohibition.) Overcriminalization arguments about environmental
crime, however, devalue the moral content of environmental violations. Many
environmental crimes are malum in se, and those that are malum prohibitum derive
* moral value from the rule of law and the degree to which they advance the societal
goals of pollution prevention. As a result, environmental laws are not in tension
with social norms regarding the morality of pollution.
B. The Complexity of Environmental Crime
A separate concern about criminal enforcement under the environmental laws
involves the complexity of the underlying statutory and regulatory systems.
Environmental regulations consume multiple volumes of the Code of Federal
Regulations and hundreds (if not thousands) of parts and subparts of those
volumes. Critics of environmental criminal enforcement often quote a former EPA
Assistant Administrator for the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
who stated, "RCRA is a regulatory cuckoo land of definition.. .. I believe we have
five people in the Agency who understand what 'hazardous waste' is."'40 Indeed,
although RCRA is one of the more difficult environmental regulatory programs, it
is by no means the only environmental statute with complex implementing
regulations.
Nor are critics of environmental regulation the only commentators who have
suggested that the complexity of environmental law raises challenges for criminal
39 See, e.g., Sidney M. Wolf, Finding an Environmental Felon Under the Corporate
Veil: The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine and RCRA, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
1, 1 (1993) (describing the "growing public consciousness that harm to the environment is
a serious crime"); Mandiberg, supra note 37, at 28 (discussing how public attitude toward
the environment has changed and many now view pollution as wrongful).
40 See, e.g., United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873, 882 (E.D. Wash. 1991)
(quoting former EPA Assistant Administrator Don R. Clay).
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enforcement. Richard Lazarus, who has written eloquently about environmental
law for more than two decades and is an advocate for strong environmental
enforcement, has questioned whether environmental law and criminal law are
sufficiently integrated for effective criminal enforcement to occur.4 ' While
Professor Lazarus wrote at a time of great upheaval in the environmental crimes
program, his argument went beyond temporal problems. Professor Lazarus
identified environmental law's complexity as a distinguishing feature that arguably
makes it a difficult fit for criminal enforcement.42 Professor Lazarus focused on
technicality (the scientific underpinnings of environmental law require expertise to
master), indeterminacy (the uncertain jurisdictional lines that define what conduct
is covered by the environmental laws, and the reality that much of environmental
law does not involve prohibitions against pollution, but limits on how much one
can lawfully pollute), and obscurity (the volume and density of the various
regulatory definitions and concepts).43
Without question, environmental law is complex. Environmental law raises
conceptual and practical challenges even for respected scholars and experienced
practitioners. Much of environmental regulation involves sophisticated and
technologically advanced industrial processes. As a result, at least from a
theoretical perspective, environmental law and criminal law could be difficult to
integrate effectively. The criminal law demands the violation of clear legal duties;
environmental law offers dense regulatory requirements.44
Compounding the potential integration problem, Congress imposed few limits
on which environmental regulations could be subject to criminal enforcement.
Instead, Congress used broad statutory. language that reaches pollution violations
(both the failure to obtain required permits and exceeding permit limits) and most
paperwork violations, thus criminalizing the failure to comply with relatively
obscure recordkeeping and document maintenance requirements. RCRA, for
example, makes it a crime to knowingly fail "to file any record, application,
manifest, report, or other document required to be maintained or filed for purposes
of compliance with regulations promulgated by" the EPA or an authorized State
under the statute.45 Inasmuch as RCRA established a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory
system for hazardous waste, with innumerable document maintenance
4' Lazarus, supra note 11, at 2445-85.
42 Lazarus also saw challenges for criminal enforcement because of the aspirational
qualities of environmental law (the degree to which Congress sets lofty, if arguably
unattainable, goals such as the elimination of all discharges into waters of the United States
by 1985) and the dynamic tendencies of environmental law (the changes in the law that
accompany greater understanding of the harmful effects of pollution-and the ever-shifting
political support for strong environmental protection). Id. at 2424-28.
41 Id. at 2429-38.
44 Similar concerns could be raised about prosecution for other regulatory crimes,
such as antitrust, securities, and tax violations, which also involve complex regulatory
schemes and highly technical issues of proof.
45 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(4) (2006).
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requirements, the potential scope of criminal liability under RCRA (and other
environmental statutes) is extensive.
From a practical perspective, however, whether the complexity of
environmental law raises problems for criminal enforcement depends upon
whether prosecutors pursue cases that involve issues of regulatory uncertainty.
Congress often uses broad statutory language to address white-collar crimes,
because the sophistication of the regulated businesses makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to anticipate all the scenarios where criminal prosecution might be
appropriate. The relevant question thus becomes whether there are sufficient legal
and prudential safeguards in the environmental context to ensure that prosecutors
do not abuse their discretion by pursuing criminal charges against defendants who
run afoul of complex regulations, which reasonably could be subject to conflicting
or uncertain interpretations. While there may be circumstances where overreaching
has occurred, a number of safeguards exist.
First, due process concerns preclude criminal prosecution when the meaning
of the law is unclear. "A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give
notice of the required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties... .,46
Although fair notice requirements are more relaxed in the business context,47
statutory and regulatory requirements are "void for vagueness" if a reasonable
person in the defendant's position would be unable to determine what conduct is
forbidden by the law.48
Given the complexity of the environmental laws, it is not surprising that
numerous void-for-vagueness challenges have been brought in environmental
criminal prosecutions. 49 The government has an inherent advantage in responding
to these challenges because the regulated community is presumed to have a
heightened understanding of the legal obligations governing its activities.5° In
addition, at least some cases that involve regulatory complexity are resolved by
plea agreement, so the vagueness of the underlying regulations is never litigated.
Nonetheless, the fact that so few void-for-vagueness challenges have been
successful may indicate that prosecutors focus on cases where the meaning of the
underlying regulations is clear. At a minimum, the void-for-vagueness principle
provides doctrinal protection against prosecution when the law is unsettled.
46 Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952) (citing
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)).
41 Cf United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1289 (9th Cir. 1993) (lowering fair
notice requirements for "'conduct of a select group of persons having specialized
knowledge' (quoting Precious Metals Assocs., Inc., v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 620 F.2d 900, 907 (1st Cir. 1980))).
48 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (citations omitted);
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
41 See, e.g., United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying
appellant's void-for-vagueness challenge).
50 See Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d at 1.289 (citations omitted).
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Second, the rule of lenity reinforces the void-for-vagueness doctrine by
requiring courts in criminal cases to resolve ambiguities about the meaning of the
law in favor of the defendant. The rule of lenity "is rooted in the concern of the law
for individual rights, and in the belief that fair warning should be accorded as to
what conduct is criminal and punishable by deprivation of liberty or property."51
As an example, in United States v. Plaza Health Laboratories, the Second Circuit
vacated convictions under the Clean Water Act, concluding that it was not clear
that a human being could be a point source under the Act.5 2 The Second Circuit's
decision is one of the few times a defendant has prevailed on rule of lenity
grounds, which could demonstrate that courts do not give sufficient weight to
lenity arguments. On the other hand, the fact that prosecutors usually prevail could
be another indication that prosecutors exercise their discretion to avoid cases
where the underlying regulations are ambiguous. At the very least, the rule of
lenity provides further doctrinal protection against government overreaching.
Third, the burden of proof in criminal cases counsels the government to avoid
prosecution where the meaning of the law is difficult to ascertain. The government
must prove a criminal defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which is
difficult to accomplish where the underlying regulations and definitions are
confusing or unclear. There are limits to this argument; criminal trials can involve
complex areas of proof and extensive instructions of law from the court. But the
government's ability to convince a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt is
compromised if a criminal prosecution focuses on unduly complex statutory and
regulatory concepts. Prosecutors have limited resources and tend not to pursue
cases that are unwinnable. It is not surprising, therefore, that environmental crime
prosecutors generally have left to their civil counterparts the more controversial
enforcement issues.
53
Due process protections and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion do not
invalidate the concerns that were raised prospectively about whether
environmental law and criminal law could be integrated effectively. From a
theoretical perspective, reconciling the vagaries of environmental law with the due
process demands of criminal law presents challenges. A fair consideration of those
challenges, however, requires evaluating the complexity of environmental law
alongside the doctrinal protections of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the rule
of lenity. If those protections are given meaning by the courts, and if they are
honored in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, criminal enforcement should
5' Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974) (citations omitted).
52 3 F.3d 643, 649-50 (2d Cir. 1993). Judge Oakes argued in dissent that the point
source requirement distinguishes controllable discharges from those that are not from a
discrete source. Id. at 650-56 (Oakes, J., dissenting). There is nothing in the legislative
history that suggests that a person cannot be a point source; indeed, all point source
discharges arguably involve humans in some way.
53 The New Source Review litigation provides arguably the best example of the
preference for civil enforcement where regulatory terns are unclear. See Envtl. Def. v.
Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007).
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not involve issues of regulatory uncertainty. In addition, criminal enforcement
under the environmental laws can be reserved for types of violations that are less
likely to raise integration concerns. This issue will be discussed further in Part IV.
III. MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME
AND THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE
When Congress amended the environmental laws in the 1980s to make
environmental crimes felonies, it also changed the mental state requirements for
Clean Water Act prosecutions from "willfully or negligently" for misdemeanors to
"knowingly" for felonies and "negligently" for misdemeanors.54 By eliminating the
willfulness requirement and substituting a knowledge requirement, Congress
provided consistency among the criminal provisions of the major environmental
statutes and aligned the mental state requirements for environmental crimes with
the requirements for many other federal criminal statutes."
Numerous commentators nonetheless expressed concern that Congress had
reduced the mental state requirements for environmental crime when it adopted the
knowingly standard.56 They predicted that felony prosecutions would result in
situations where a defendant had no idea that she was doing anything wrong,
which would be unfair in an area of regulatory complexity. Compounding the
matter, the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act include "responsible corporate
officers" in the definition of a "person" covered by the criminal provisions of the
statutes. 57 Some analysts suggested that the responsible corporate officer doctrine
would allow corporate officials to be prosecuted for acts that they did not know
were occurring. 58 This Part evaluates each of these arguments.
A. The "Knowingly" Mental State Requirement
The number of environmental criminal cases surged after Congress amended
the environmental laws during the 1980s and increased even more dramatically
after Congress passed the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, which required the
14 See Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-4, 101 Stat. 42 (1987) (amending
section 1319 of the Clean Water Act).
51 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 922, 924 (2006) (firearms); id. § 1015 (immigration
violations); id. § 1344 (bank fraud); id. § 1461-1463 (obscenity); id. § 1623 (false
declarations); 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006) (controlled substances).
56 See Gaynor,.supra note 7, at 11-12 (arguing that the mental state requirements for
environmental crimes are lower than for other crimes); Shafer, supra note 18, at 538
("RCRA's minimal knowledge requirements impose near strict liability on corporate
officers."); Wolf, supra note 39, at 12 ("[c]hanging from specific intent to general intent is
a significant reduction of the intent requirement.").
7 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2006); § 42 U.S.C. 7413(c)(6) (2006).
58 Onsdorff & Mesnard, supra note 9, at 10104.
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EPA to hire 200 criminal investigators.5 9 In the ensuing years, many criminal
prosecutions involved litigation over the knowledge requirements for
environmental crime. Courts frequently described the question as determining how
far down the sentence the word "knowingly" traveled. For example, RCRA
imposes criminal penalties on any person who "knowingly treats, stores, or
disposes of any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter-(A)
without a permit under this subchapter. ,,60 As a matter of statutory construction,
reviewing courts framed the question as one of syntax: which words did
"knowingly" modify?61 Similar questions were raised in cases prosecuted under
the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act.
62
Although characterized as an issue of statutory construction, the question in
cases addressing the mental state requirements for environmental crime was
whether the government was required to prove knowledge of the law.63 Prosecutors
argued that knowledge of the facts was sufficient. They cited the time-honored
maxim that "ignorance of the law is no defense" and argued that the principle
carried greater weight where deleterious or hazardous substances are involved.64
Defense counsel countered that the knowingly requirement would be meaningless
if it did not also include knowledge of the governing legal requirements,
particularly in cases where defendants were charged with knowing violation of
permit limits. 65 They asserted that a defendant who had a permit authorizing
discharges could not be criminally prosecuted for permit violations unless she
knew the permit was violated.66
The courts overwhelmingly sided with the government. In RCRA cases, the
government only was required to show that a defendant knew the material that was
transported, treated, stored, or disposed of improperly had a substantial "potential
to be harmful to others or the environment., 67 The government was not required to
prove that the defendant knew the material met the legal definition of hazardous
waste.6 8 In Clean Air Act cases involving asbestos renovation and demolition, the
59 See Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, § 202, 104 Stat. 2962
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006)).
60 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2), (d)(2)(A) (2006).
61 See, e.g., United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1989).
62 See, e.g., United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 88-89 (6th Cir. 1991) (Clean Air
Act); United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1995) (Clean Water Act).
63 See, e.g., Buckley, 934 F.2d at 88 ("[T]he statute requires knowledge only of the
emissions themselves, not knowledge of the statute .... ).
64 See United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 562, 565 (1971).
65 See, e.g., United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
argument that "the government must prove that [appellant] knew that his conduct violated
either the [Clean Water Act] or the [National Pollution Discharge Elimination System]
permit").
66 See id. at 715-16.
67 United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 965, 967 (2d Cir. 1993).
68 Id. at 965.
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government was required to show that the defendant knew that asbestos was being
removed and the methods used to remove it; the government was not required to
show that the defendant knew the legal requirements that governed asbestos
removal.69 Similarly, in Clean Water Act cases, the government was required to
prove that the defendant knew what was being discharged, although knowledge of
the law was not required.7 °
The unifying theme of the appellate court decisions considering mental state
requirements for environmental crime was that the government must prove
knowledge of the facts but not knowledge of the law.71 The Supreme Court
subsequently made clear in a firearms case that the appellate courts were
construing knowledge consistent with the general approach of the criminal law.72
The Court explained that the term "knowingly" does not involve a culpable state of
mind or knowledge of the law because individuals are presumed to know the legal
requirements. that govern their actions.73 The term "knowingly" "merely requires
proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense" (in contrast to
willfulness, which requires "that the defendant acted with an evil meaning mind,
that is, that he acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful").74
Other federal regulatory crimes, including food and drug, antitrust, and
securities violations, also impose criminal liability using a knowingly standard.75
Still, there are legitimate questions that can be raised about the appropriateness of a
mental state standard for environmental crime that does not require knowledge of
regulatory requirements. If much of environmental law is technical and complex, a
defendant might reasonably but erroneously believe her conduct was lawful. Such
misunderstandings might be particularly likely with new regulatory programs or
69 See United States v. Buckley, 934 F.2d 84, 88 (6th Cir. 1991).
70 See United States v. Cooper, 482 F.3d 658, 665-68 (4th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 390-91 (5th Cir. 1996).
71 The one exception was United States v. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d 662, 669 (3d
Cir. 1984), where the Third Circuit required knowledge of the permit requirement. No
subsequent court has followed Johnson & Towers, however, and given the contrary
authority that has emerged in the twenty-five years since Johnson & Towers was decided, it
is not clear whether the Third Circuit would impose the same knowledge requirements if it
considered the issue again today.
72 Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
71 Id. at 192-93.
74 Id. at 193. Bryan may be in tension with the Court's ruling in United States v.
Liparota, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985), where the Court construed "knowingly" in a food
stamp case to require knowledge of unlawfulness. In Bryan, the Court distinguished and
perhaps limited Liparota, explaining that knowingly requires only knowledge of the facts
"unless the text of the statute dictates a different result." Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193.
75 Two exceptions, closely related to environmental crime, are prosecutions under the
hazardous material transportation and worker safety laws. See Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5128 (2006); Occupational Safety and Health Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2006).
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when the government changes its interpretation of the governing law.76 Yet
mistake of law is not a defense for environmental crime.77
As discussed above, however, the void-for-vagueness doctrine should protect
defendants from criminal prosecution when the meeting of the law is unclear, and
the rule of lenity requires courts to construe ambiguous statutory and regulatory
terms in the defendant's favor. In addition, the government generally avoids
criminal prosecution when the meaning of statutory and regulatory terms is not
well established. As a result, the likelihood of an honest mistake of law arising in
the context of a criminal prosecution may be more theoretical than practical.
Nor is it true that the knowingly mental state requirement is a reduced mens
rea tantamount to strict liability." Strict liability offenses allow a defendant to be
held liable in the absence of any knowledge of the facts that constitute a
violation. 79 Under the environmental laws, a jury can find a defendant guilty only
if the defendant has knowledge of all nonjurisdictional facts. For example; a
defendant who discharged gasoline into a sewer system but thought he was
discharging water would not have knowledge of the fact that he had discharged a
material that met the legal definition of a "pollutant."80
The more difficult question is what knowledge of nonjurisdictional facts
means in the environmental context. Model jury instructions state that "an act is
done knowingly if the defendant is aware of the act and does not act through
ignorance, mistake or accident. 81 While the instruction requires awareness of the
act, it does not explain which facts a defendant must know. In some contexts,
appellate courts have provided answers. For example, in a RCRA prosecution for
disposal without a permit, a defendant must know that the material is waste and
that it has the substantial potential to be harmful to others and the environment. 82 It
is less clear, however, that appellate courts have required knowledge of all
76 Of particular concern would be situations where the government issues guidance
documents construing regulatory requirements that affect the government's regulatory and
litigation positions, but do hot have the force of law and therefore are not published based
on notice and comment.
77 See, e.g., United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 716-17 (8th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 1996).
78 Brickey, supra note 10, at 120-23; cf Kepten D. Carmichael, Note, Strict Criminal
Liability for Environmental Violations: A Need for Judicial Restraint, 71 IND. L.J. 729, 729
(1996) (warning against "judicially created strict liability for environmental regulatory
violations").
79 See, e.g., United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 622-23 (1st Cir. 1974)
(indicating that strict liability prosecution requires no proof of scienter).
80 See Ahmad, 101 F.3d at 391. The exception to the rule articulated in Ahmad occurs
when the defendant is willfully blind to the relevant facts, meaning she took affirmative
steps to shield herself from facts that otherwise would have been obvious. See, e.g., United
States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1995) (defendant could not escape liability
if he "deliberately and consciously avoided" knowledge of the violation).
81 NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTkuCTIONS § 5.6 (2003).
82 United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d, 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1993).
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nonjurisdictional facts. For example, in the same RCRA disposal case, the
government would not be required to prove that the defendant knew she did not
have a permit, 83 even though the absence of a permit is an element of the offense.
In still other contexts, the courts have struggled with the distinction between
knowledge of the law and knowledge of the facts. The best example is Clean
Water Act permit violation cases, where a defendant must know a discharge
occurred and presumably must know the facts that made the discharge a permit
violation (i.e., elevated levels of a pollutant or improper treatment). Absent that
additional knowledge, there would be no way to distinguish the knowledge of a
defendant who discharged in compliance with a permit from the knowledge of a
defendant who discharged in violation of a permit. Appellate courts have provided
little guidance about what those additional facts might be, other than to explain that
a defendant is not required to know that the discharge violated the permit.84
In the years ahead, as more environmental cases reach the Supreme Court,
there may be further attention given to the meaning of the knowledge requirements
for environmental crime. While the legal framework is well settled in the appellate
courts, the Supreme Court has been willing to set aside longstanding
understandings of statutory terms in the environmental context.85 Still, Congress
appears to have. made the right choice by requiring knowledge rather than
willfulness. Corporations and individuals who are subject to the environmental
laws should be presumed to know their legal obligations. To hold otherwise might
create an incentive for companies to be ignorant of the law, which would
undermine environmental protection efforts. By requiring knowledge of the facts,
Congress properly imposed on prosecutors the burden of proving that defendants
knew about the conduct involved, while placing the burden on the regulated
community to conform its conduct to the environmental laws.
B. The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
Congress included responsible corporate officers in the definition of "person"
under the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act. 86 The responsible corporate
83 United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037-39 (9th Cir. 1989).
84 United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 (9th Cir. 1993); Hopkins, 53 F.3d
at 541; cf United States v. Sinskey, 119 F.3d 712, 715-16 (8th Cir. 1997). "
85 See, e.g., Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870,
1879-80 (2009) (reversing definition of "arranger liability" applicable to CERCLA cost
recovery actions); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006) (rejecting regulatory
definition of "waters of the United States" applicable to Clean Water Act regulation and
enfdrcement).
86 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(6) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(6) (2006). Significantly,
RCRA does not include responsible corporate officerg in its definition of person, which
raises the question of whether the doctrine would apply in RCRA cases. Because Congress
did not reference responsible corporate officers in RCRA, it would be reasonable to,
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officer doctrine originated in two Supreme Court cases involving violations of the
food and drug laws, United States v. Dotterweich7 and United States v. Park.s In
Dotterweich, the Court upheld a strict liability misdemeanor conviction of a
corporate official "standing in responsible relation to a public danger.,8 9 The Court
recognized there might be circumstances where injustice could result from a strict
liability prosecution but declined to limit the reach of its holding, relying instead
on "the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the
ultimate judgment of juries . . . .90 In Park, the Court further extrapolated its
holding in Dotterweich, explaining it would be appropriate to hold "criminally
accountable the persons whose failure to exercise the authority and supervisory
responsibility reposed in them by the business organization resulted in the
violation" and that the law "imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and
remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement
measures that will insure that violations will not occur." 91
The inclusion of the responsible corporate officer doctrine in the Clean Air
Act and Clean Water Act has prompted concern that individuals could commit
felony violations of the environmental laws without knowledge of the underlying
facts. 92 Under this argument, a corporate official could be convicted of a felony
and sentenced to a multiyear jail sentence based on status alone (e.g., a responsible
relation to the violation). Nor does reliance on the good judgment of prosecutors
(and judges and juries) provide much comfort to critics of the doctrine. Criminal
prosecution can be personally and professionally devastating, even if the result is
exoneration.
The responsible corporate officer doctrine expands the' definition of persons
who can be criminally prosecuted; it holds that corporate officials, who stand in a
responsible relationship to a violation, can be prosecuted for their failure to prevent
the violation. 93 The doctrine imposes a duty to act on responsible corporate
conclude that the doctrine does not apply; on the other hand, the principles underlying the
doctrine appear applicable to RCRA.
87 320 U.S. 277, 281-84 (1943).
88 421 U.S. 658, 660 (1975).
89 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
90 Id. at 285.
9' Park, 421 U.S. at 671-72.
92 See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Charles J. Babbitt et al.,
Discretion and the Criminalization of Environmental Law, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L & POL'Y. F.
1, 8-9 (2004) (asserting that corporate officers may be held criminally liable on the basis of
their position in the company even though they have no actual knowledge of the conduct);
David C. Fortney, Thinking Outside the "Black Box": Tailored Enforcement in
Environmental Criminal Law, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1609, 1624-25 (2003) (arguing that, given
the realities of corporate decision making and knowledge, "we should hesitate before
applying strict liability criminal sanctions to corporate officers for the malfeasance of their
employees").
93 See, e.g., United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).
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officials, thereby eliminating the direct act requirement and creating liability for a
failure to act.
94
Significantly, however, the responsible corporate officer doctrine does not
dispense with the underlying mental state requirements. The felony provisions of
the environmental laws require that the defendant act knowingly.95 As a result, the
holdings of Dotterweich and Park, which involved strict liability offenses, must be
adapted to reflect the higher mental state for environmental crimes, which require
proof of knowledge. For those violations, a responsible corporate officer can only
be found guilty if she (1) knows the conduct is occurring, (2) has the authority to
prevent the conduct from occurring, and (3) fails to prevent the conduct. 96 Except
in a case of willful blindness, 97 even a responsible corporate officer cannot be
found liable for her failure if she lacks knowledge of the facts.
As noted in section A of this Part, there are challenges inherent in determining
what facts a defendant must know in a prosecution for environmental crime. Those
questions would carry over into a prosecution based on the responsible corporate
officer doctrine, since the knowledge requirements would be the same. As a result,
to prove that a responsible corporate officer "knows the conduct is occurring," the
government must show that she knows all nonjurisdictional facts. Absent that
knowledge, a prosecution under the responsible corporate officer doctrine would
expand criminal liability unfairly, just as it would in a case that did not involve use
of the.doctrine.
Nonetheless, critics of the responsible corporate officer doctrine miss the
mark when they argue that the doctrine allows conviction based on status alone,
without proof of knowledge. They attack a strict liability straw man from the
statutes construed in Dotterweich and Park and erroneously conclude that
Congress eliminated the knowingly requirement for environmental crime. When
the responsible officer doctrine is properly understood as imposing a duty to act,98
it is clear that corporate officials cannot be prosecuted based on status alone.
Instead, the responsible corporate officer doctrine serves the broader goals of-
environmental protection and deterrence of violations by ensuring that corporate
officials with authority over environmental compliance cannot ignore violations
they know are occurring and have the ability to prevent.
94 See, e.g., id. at 1026.
95 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
96 Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1022-26.
9' See United States v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding
defendant could not escape liability if he "deliberately and consciously avoided"
knowledge of the violation).
98 Susan F. Mandiberg, Moral Issues in Environmental Crime, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L.J. 881, 897-98 (1996).
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IV. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND WHAT MAKES AN ENVIRONMENTAL CASE
CRIMINAL
A common denominator of the concerns raised about criminal enforcement
under the environmental laws is that prosecutors have too much discretion to
determine which violations are criminal. The breadth of the environmental laws
and the expansive language of their criminal provisions make it possible for a wide
range of conduct to be criminalized. The knowingly standard allows more
violations to be charged than the willfulness standard, which further expands
prosecutorial discretion. As a result, commentators have suggested that Congress
should have defined better what is an environmental crime, rather than delegating
"line-drawing" authority to prosecutors in the executive branch. 99 This Part
considers the role of prosecutorial discretion in the environmental crimes program
and identifies the types of violations that may warrant criminal enforcement.
A. Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime
The environmental laws make only limited distinctions between what conduct
gives rise to criminal and civil liability. While some statutory provisions apply
only to civil and administrative cases, 00 the same conduct theoretically could give
rise to criminal, civil, or adnministrative enforcement. Stated differently, the act
requirement is the same for criminal, civil, and administrative cases; the primary
distinguishing feature of criminal enforcement is the mental state requirement.
It is not unusual that mental state requirements provide the primary distinction
between criminal and civil liability, especially for regulatory violations. 1' Indeed,
mental state is an essential element of all crimes (except strict liability offenses): a
crime occurs when a prohibited act (actus reus) is committed with the requisite
mental state (mens rea). Because so much conduct is covered by the environmental
laws, however, and the government is not required to prove knowledge of the law,
prosecutors have broad discretion to determine what is criminal. Even when
knowledge of the facts is present, the government can elect between criminal, civil,
and administrative remedies. While Congress may have intended to provide the
government a range of enforcement options, similar violations could be treated
differently depending upon who investigates the matter and who decides how the
99 Lazarus, supra note 6, at 883-84. See also Susan F. Mandiberg, Fault Lines in the
Clean Water Act: Criminal Enforcement, Continuing Violations, and Mental State, 33
ENVTL. L. 173, 174 (2003) (characterizing the criminal provisions of environmental law as
grafted onto civil and administrative schemes almost as an afterthought).
'oo See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6927(a) (2006) (discussing RCRA's split sample
requirement); id. § 6928(a)(2) (requiring the EPA to provide advance notice to state
authorities before bringing an enforcement action in a state that is authorized to conduct a
hazardous waste program).
'' See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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violation should be addressed. 0 2 Moreover, with broad discretion comes the risk
that criminal prosecution will occur in circumstances where criminal enforcement
is not appropriate.
First, as discussed in Part II, the underlying regulations may be too new or too
complicated for criminal enforcement. While these concerns are addressed in part
by the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the rule of lenity, only prosecutorial
discretion precludes the government from bringing criminal charges in the more
controversial areas of environmental law. Second, knowing endangerment is the
only pollution crime frequently charged by the government that makes the
seriousness of the violation an element of the offense. 10 3 Outside of the knowing
endangerment context, de minimus or highly technical violations could be
criminally prosecuted. Third, only the Clean Air Act limits the definition of
"person" covered by the criminal provisions of the environmental laws. 10 4 As a
result, under other environmental statutes, low-level employees could be
prosecuted, even if they lacked the decision-making autonomy normally associated
with criminal liability.
Each of the scenarios described above raises potential fairness issues and, at
least conceptually, risks diminishing both the significance and moral opprobrium
of the criminal sanction. If charges are brought for conduct that does not warrant
criminal prosecution or against individuals who lack sufficient culpability, the
legitimacy of the environmental laws and the deterrent purposes of the criminal
law would be undermined.
On the other hand, while prosecutorial discretion is broad under the
environmental laws, environmental prosecutors may not have more discretion than
other prosecutors.10 5 Investigative and pr-osecutorial discretion are central features
102 In the early years of the environmental crimes program, practitioners claimed
whether a case was criminal or civil depended largely on where within the EPA the'case
began. If the case developed as a civil case, it remained a civil case (regardless of whether
the defendant acted knowingly); if the case began as a criminal case, it was eventually
referred for criminal prosecution (regardless of whether it involved the type of egregious
conduct that warranted criminal enforcement). See Starr, supra note 6, at 913-14. Since
that time, the EPA has developed case screening protocols to ensure the agency uses
consistent criteria in determining what enforcement response is appropriate. Clearly,
however, whether a case is criminal or civil should not depend upon the bureaucratic
vagaries of whether the matter originates with a criminal investigator or civil regulator.
103 The Clean Water Act authorizes criminal prosecution for knowing discharges of
oil or hazardous substances "in such quantities as may be harmful as determined [by
regulations under the Act]," 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (b)(3) (2006), but it is not a frequently used
charge in criminal cases.
'0 42 U.S.C. § 7413(h) (2006). Except in the case of knowing and willful violations,
the Clean Air Act excludes individuals who are not senior management personnel and
corporate officers and employees who are carrying out normal duties and acting under
orders from the employer. Id.
'05 Brickey, supra note 10, at 127 ( "[Critics] suggest surprising naivet& about the
degree of precision and certainty found in federal criminal law and the role that discretion
2009] 1243
UTAH LAW REVIEW
of all criminal enforcement programs. Congress drafts criminal provisions in broad
terms to ensure that cases warranting prosecution can be addressed, while relying
on prosecutorial discretion to decline marginal cases. 10 6 It could be argued that
Congress relies too much on prosecutorial discretion, but it would be difficult for
Congress to craft statutory requirements that would replace prosecutorial
discretion. Whether a violation is egregious enough to warrant criminal
prosecution involves factors that may be present to different degrees in different
cases. Such factors, like principles of fairness, may not be reduced easily to
statutory elements.
Nor is prosecutorial discretion in the environmental context unfettered. The
EPA requires its criminal investigators to focus on matters involving significant
environmental harm and culpable conduct, with culpability defined to include
repetitive violations, deliberate misconduct, and acts of concealment or
falsification.10 7 Likewise, Justice Department prosecutors must follow the
Department's Principles of Federal Prosecution, which require prosecutors to
consider the nature and seriousness of the offense, the deterrent value of the
prosecution, and the availability of non-criminal alternatives to prosecution.
10
Although the EPA and Justice Department policy documents do not create legal
rights for defendants or impose legal duties on the government, they provide
institutional constraints on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Prosecutors of environmental crime also must exercise their discretion
mindful of how judges will respond to the charges, a calculation that may result in
greater caution because environmental crimes are not prosecuted as often as
traditional crimes. Federal district court judges must accept guilty pleas and
preside over trials. While judges have no authority over charging decisions, their
legal and evidentiary rulings can affect the government's ability to obtain a
conviction. Moreover, judges have authority under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure to enter judgment of acquittal if they believe the government
has not sustained its burden of proof, and to award attorney's fees to the defendant
if they find that the prosecution is frivolous, vexatious, or in bad faith.109 In these
ways, judges influence the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in environmental
necessarily plays in its enforcement."); see also David A. Barker, Note, Environmental
Crimes, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Civil/Criminal Line, 88 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1421
(2002) (stating broad prosecutorial discretion is "quite typical of criminal law" and may be
less objectionable in the context of environmental crimes, "where most defendants will be
quite capably represented").
106 See Brickey, supra note 10, at 129-30.
107 Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Director, Office of Criminal Enforcement,
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to All EPA Employees Working in or in Support of the Criminal
Enforcement Program 4-5 (Jan. 12, 1994), available at http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/resources/policies/criminal/exercise.pdf.
108 U. S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-27.230-9-27.250 (1997).
'09 Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3006A (2006) (statutory note)).
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cases, much as they do for other federal crimes, and provide at least some
protection to defendants in the event that prosecutors abuse their discretion.
Finally, juries influence how prosecutors exercise their discretion in
environmental cases. As noted in Part II, prosecutors have limited resources and
avoid cases they will lose. The Principles of Federal Prosecution state that "as a
matter of fundamental fairness and in the interest of the efficient administration of
justice, no prosecution should be initiated against any person unless the
government believes that the person probably will be found guilty by an unbiased
trier of fact."11 Here again, prosecutors are likely to be cautious because the jury
appeal of environmental cases may depend, upon factors other than legal
sufficiency. Even in cases where the government meets its burden of proof, jury
nullification may occur if the conduct is not egregious enough.
In sum, although there always is a danger of prosecutorial abuse when
discretion is broad, and those risks are present in the environmental context,
reliance on prosecutorial discretion is a central feature of our criminal justice
system. We depend upon the fair exercise of prosecutorial discretion to filter out
cases that, while technically meeting the statutory elements for prosecution, do not
warrant criminal sanctions. Prosecutorial discretion in the environmental context is
no different. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[i]n such matters the good
sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment
of juries must be trusted."''
B. What Makes an Environmental Case Criminal?
Because Congress gave broad discretion to prosecutors in determining what
violations should be criminally enforced, the theoretical issue becomes whether
specific discretionary factors make cases appropriate for criminal enforcement and
thus answer the question about what makes an environmental case criminal. The
proper exercise of prosecutorial discretion involves more than a rote elements
analysis. For cases to have jury appeal, it should be possible to determine what
makes a particular matter a criminal case. Moreover, from a systemic perspective,
identifying the discretionary factors that make environmental violations criminal
may mitigate concerns about the expansive statutory definition of environmental
crime. This Section describes four categories of environmental violations that may
be appropriate for criminal sanctions and therefore should be the focus of the
government's criminal enforcement efforts." 2
"c U.S. ATToRNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 108, at § 9-27.220B.
"' United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943).
112 The categories identified in this Part focus on evidentiary factors that should affect
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. At least one other scholar has attempted to classify
by type of violation. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The
Intersection of Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REv 487, 514-25
(1997) (classifying environmental crimes as either administrative or substantive violations).
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1. Cases Involving Significant Harm or Risk of Harm to the Environment or
Public Health
The first category of cases that may be appropriate for criminal enforcement
is violations involving significant harm or risk of harm to the environment or
public health. Congress included knowing endangerment provisions in RCRA, the
Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air Act, thereby acknowledging the significance
of cases involving harm or risk of harm to public health." 3 As a matter of
prosecutorial discretion, the government considers criminal prosecution in most
cases that involve significant harm or risk of harm to the environment."
4
The classic example of a case that was criminal because of the gravity of the
harm involved was the prosecution of the Exxon Valdez Oil spill.' 1 5 No one would
argue that Exxon Shipping Company intended to release hundreds of thousands of
gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. The United States nonetheless
prosecuted Exxon because there was evidence that the company was negligent in
its crew supervision and the resulting harm was so substantial.'
1 6
From a public health standpoint, there are even more examples of cases that
were criminally prosecuted because of the deaths and injuries that occurred. The
United States recently prosecuted British Petroleum for Clean Air Act violations at
a Texas refinery that resulted in fifteen deaths. 1 7 W.R. Grace Corp. was
prosecuted, although eventually acquitted, for Clean Air Act knowing
endangerment after hundreds of people died of asbestos-related diseases in Libby,
Montana.1 8 Perhaps not surprisingly, the longest jail sentences for environmental
crime have occurred in cases where there were significant injuries or public health
risks. In United States v. Elias, a federal district court judge sentenced the
113 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (2006); 42 U.S.C. §
7413(c)(1) (2006).
114 Given the significance of environmental harm, it could be argued that Congress
should make harm an element that the government must prove. The problem with requiring
proof of harm, apart from the fact that harm is just one of several discretionary factors that
may make cases criminal, is that it would raise difficult and potentially insurmountable
evidentiary issues. Environmental harm often is cumulative and a matter of degree.
Requiring proof of harm for the discharge of pollutants measured in parts per million
would reduce criminal trials to scientific debates about the ecological effects of pollution,
which, although a worthy topic in other contexts, should not determine guilt or innocence.
115 See William H. Rodgers et al., The Exxon Valdez Reopener: Natural Resources
Damage Settlements and Roads Not Taken, 22 ALASKA L. REv. 135, 150 (2005) ("The
Exxon Shipping Company and the Exxon Corporation faced five criminal charges as a
result of the spill.").
116 See Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes,
59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 781, 782-83 (1991).
117 United States v. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc., 610 F. Supp. .2d 655, 660 (S.D. Tex.
2009).
118 United States v. W.R. Grace, 504 F.3d 745, 749-51 (9th Cir. 2007) (interlocutory
appeal of pre-trial orders).
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defendant to seventeen years in prison for sending his workers into a tank of
cyanide waste, which left one of the employees severely and permanently brain-
damaged. 119 In United States v. Salvagno, the defendants were sentenced to
twenty-five years and nineteen years in prison after conducting improper asbestos
removal at hundreds of buildings in New York State.
120
Few dispute the appropriateness of criminal prosecution in cases that involve
significant environmental and public health effects. The EPA devotes the first
section of its memorandum regarding the exercise of investigative discretion to
cases involving significant environmental harm.' 21 Even critics of criminal
enforcement concede that cases involving significant harm or risk of harm may be
appropriate for criminal prosecution. 22 When a violation puts the environment or
public health at risk, the goals of the environmental protection laws are
undermined, and there are significant societal costs.
Ironically, cases involving significant harm or risk of harm may raise the
greatest danger of prosecutorial overreaching. When an environmental catastrophe
occurs or a violation puts lives at risk, there is a natural tendency to seek the most
severe sanction possible. 123 The government receives a more sympathetic hearing
about any legal issues that arise, and convictions are easier to obtain and affirm on
appeal. Yet, without sufficient evidence of wrongdoing, neither the desire for
retribution nor the jury appeal of cases involving harm justifies criminal
prosecution.
Investigators and prosecutors should be expected to look for more than simply
the harm or risk involved when determining whether to pursue criminal charges.
After all, with the exception of knowing endangerment,124 neither harm nor risk of
harm is an element the government must prove. As a result, while cases involving
harm or risk are appropriate to consider for possible criminal enforcement, the
government should prosecute only when there is evidence that the violations
charged caused the harm (and not simply that violations occurred that had
minimal, if any, causal relationship to the harm). Likewise, the government should
emphasize cases where the defendant was aware of the risks associated with the
misconduct (or willfully blind to those facts). By limiting criminal prosecutions to
violations that caused the harm and to defendants who knew or should have known
"9 269 F.3d 1003, 1007-09 (9th Cir. 2001).
120 See United States v. Salvagno, No. 06-4202-cr(L), 2009 WL 2634655, at * 1 (2d
Cir. Aug. 29, 2009) (sentencing Alexander Salvagno to 300 months imprisonment); United
States v. Salvagno, No. 06-4201-cr(L), 2009 WL 2634647, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 28, 2009)
(sentencing Raul Salvagno to 235 months imprisonment).
121 Memorandum from Earl Devaney, supra note 107, at 4.
122 See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 8, at 217 (identifying environmental crimes such as
endangerment as "serious offenses that do not merit leniency").
123 See Adler & Lord, supra note 116, at 821-22 (arguing for higher penalties in
cases like Exxon that cause substantial environmental harm).
124 See supra note 5.
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about the risks involved, the government will avoid opportunistic prosecutions
based solely on the desire for retribution.
2. Cases Involving Deceptive or Misleading Conduct
The second category of cases that may warrant criminal enforcement is
violations involving deceptive or misleading conduct. RCRA, the Clean Water
Act, and the Clean Air Act all include false-statement provisions and make it a
crime to fail to submit required reports to the EPA and the states.125 The Clean
Water Act, which depends upon honest self-reporting of permitted discharges, also
criminalizes tampering or rendering inaccurate a Clean Water Act monitoring
126 cotisoea t 27method. CERCLA contains one criminal provision: a failure to report crime.'
Cases involving deceptive or misleading conduct also are charged under the
general criminal provisions found in Title 18 of the United States Code. Title 18
includes conspiracy, fraud, false statements, concealment, obstruction of justice,
and perjury. 128 Prosecutors frequently include Title 18 charges, along with
environmental charges, to highlight traditional badges of criminality. By
emphasizing Title 18 charges, prosecutors emphasize the aspect of the violations
that traditionally justifies criminal enforcement (false statements, concealment,
obstruction of justice, fraud) and utilize charges that are most familiar (and
therefore acceptable) to federal district court judges.
Classic examples of violations involving deceptive and misleading conduct
are midnight dumping, hidden discharge pipes, tampering with required samples,
and falsification of required reports. For example, in United States v. Sinskey, two
individuals were convicted for conduct that included the repeated falsification of
monthly reports required under the Clean Water Act, which did not disclose any
permit violations even though the facility was discharging at levels greater than
permit limits. 129 The falsification occurred alongside efforts to manipulate the
discharges and selective sampling to make it appear that the facility was meeting
its permit limits, which the government charged as a separate violation (rendering
inaccurate a Clean Water Act monitoring method). 130
More recently, environmental crimes prosecutors have charged conspiracies
to defraud the United States and obstruction of justice when a pattern of deceptive
conduct frustrated efforts of the EPA and the states to ensure compliance with the
environmental laws. Perhaps the best example is the multi-district prosecution of
McWane, Inc., for environmental and worker safety violations at five facilities
125 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3)-(4) (2006); id. §
7413(c)(2).
126 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(4) (2006).
127 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (2006).
128 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006) (conspiracy); id. § 1001 (false statements); id. § 1341
(fraud); id. §§ 1501-1520 (obstruction); id. § 1621 (perjury).
129 119 F.3d 712, 714 (8th Cir. 1997).
130 Id.
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across the United States.' 3 ' All but one of the cases involved efforts to deceive
government regulators (and the fifth involved a worker death).
32
Whether charged as violations of false statement provisions of the
environmental laws, under Title 18, or as a pattern of misconduct, the theory of
criminality remains the same in cases involving deceptive conduct. Fair and
effective administration of the environmental laws, like other regulatory programs,
cannot occur if the government does not have complete and accurate information
about compliance from the regulated community. No -factor is more decisive than
lying in making a criminal case out of what might otherwise be a civil matter.
3. Cases Involving Facilities That Operate Outside the Regulatory System
The third category of cases where criminal prosecution may be appropriate
involves facilities that operate completely outside the regulatory system. RCRA,
the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air Act (after the 1990 amendments) include
permitting requirements. A facility that treats, stores, or disposes of hazardous
waste must obtain a RCRA permit. 133 A company that discharges waste into waters
of the United States must obtain a Clean Water Act permit.' 34 A refinery that
releases benzene must comply with the benzene NESHAPs under the Clean Air
Act.
135
In myriad ways, the environmental laws impose regulatory obligations on
facilities across America. To understand and meet regulatory requirements,
companies must make a significant financial commitment to regulatory
compliance. In addition, under many of the environmental statutes, the
government's ability to provide adequate environmental protection depends upon
its ability to identify all sources of pollution. For example, the government's
ability to ensure that air quality standards are met depends upon accurate
information about sources and quantities of pollution that affect air quality.
Companies that operate outside the regulatory system may be appropriate
targets of criminal prosecution for three reasons. First, they are flouting their legal
obligations and doing so in a system that depends upon regulated facilities to self-
identify and seek appropriate permits. Second, their conduct undermines the goal
of environmental protection by frustrating the government's ability to monitor and
control all sources of pollution. Third, they would otherwise have a significant
competitive advantage over companies that make the requisite (and costly)
commitment to environmental compliance.
131 See Uhlmann, supra note 16, at 196.
132 See id. at 196-97; David Barstow, Guilty Verdict in New Jersey Worker-Safety
Trial, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 27, 2006, at A22.
113 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (2006).
"14 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006).
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412, 7661 (2006).
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The argument for considering criminal enforcement against facilities that
operate outside the regulatory system does not mean all such violations warrant
criminal enforcement. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion, while always
essential, may carry particular significance in this category because not every
failure to participate in the regulatory system carries equal weight. Much as
prosecutors have historically avoided criminal prosecution in more ambiguous
areas of environmental law, they should ensure that the criminal sanction is
reserved for cases where the failure to meet regulatory requirements has the
potential to undermine environmental protection and does not involve technical
requirements. 136
4. Cases Involving Repetitive Violations
The fourth category of cases that may warrant criminal prosecution is
repetitive violations. EPA and state regulators often begin enforcement efforts with
a notice of violations or pursue other administrative remedies prior to seeking
judicial relief (civil or criminal). Whether a preference for 'counseling is
appropriate for violation of environmental and public health requirements might be
disputed by some environmental groups. On the other hand, some business
organizations might suggest that environmental regulators are too heavy handed
about pursuing civil or criminal enforcement.
Without resolving the normative question about whether the government
should emphasize compliance assurance or enforcement, it seems reasonable to
suggest that repeated noncompliance may warrant enforcement. 137 If the
136 For this reason, the government generally has avoided criminal prosecution for
generators who fail to obtain an EPA identification number, which is a criminal violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(4). The notice requirements imposed on generators are the first link
in the cradle-to-grave regulatory scheme created by RCRA, but criminal prosecution has
focused on the illegal transportation, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste, which
involves the greatest risk of harm to the environment and public health.
137 A recent survey conducted by the New York Times found that there were over
500,000 violations of the Clean Water Act at approximately 23,000 facilities between 2004
and 2007. Charles Duhigg, Clean Water Laws Are Neglected, at a Cost in Suffering, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2009, at Al. The New York Times's statistics do not distinguish among
types of violations, and as a result likely overstate the degree to which there has been
underenforcement of the Clean Water Act. In addition, there may be legitimate reasons for
non-enforcement, including leveraging more far-reaching compliance agreements. See
Babbitt et al., supra note 92, at 45. Nonetheless, when violations persist despite the efforts
of the regulatory agency to ensure compliance, repetitive violators may become appropriate
targets for enforcement, including criminal prosecution. See also Charles Duhigg, Millions
in U.S. Drink Dirty Water, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at Al (stating the
EPA brought enforcement cases in only 6 percent of violations of the Safe Drinking Water
Act in part because of reluctance to pursue cases against the municipalities and small towns
that operate many public water systems).
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noncompliance undermines environmental protection or continues after civil
enforcement action, criminal prosecution may be appropriate.
A classic example of a case involving repetitive violations was the
prosecution of United States v. Williams.'38 The defendant, who operated a drum
manufacturing facility, received numerous notices of violation over a period of
more. than ten years from state and federal officials.1 39 Eventually, he had
accumulated 30,000 drums in a residential neighborhood, several thousand of
which were full or partially full. 140 After a $1.5 million Superfund cleanup action,
the United States prosecuted Williams criminally for illegal storage and disposal of
hazardous waste, and he was convicted and sentenced to forty-six months
imprisonment. 
14 1
While there is little dispute about prosecution for repetitive violations in cases
like Williams, it is worth noting that there are at least two areas where the
prosecution of repetitive violations has resulted in discord: wetlands violations and
chronic noncompliance by public entities. Wetlands prosecutions are among the
most controversial criminal cases ever brought by the United States. 142 Perhaps the
contentiousness of the criminal wetlands prosecutions simply reflects disagreement
about the appropriate scope of Clean Water Act jurisdiction and the impact of
wetlands regulation on property rights. But there is no disputing the fact that
criminal enforcement has occurred, in most instances, only after the unpermitted
filling of wetlands continued after repeated warnings and civil violations.
14 3
Likewise, there is disagreement even within the environmental enforcement
community about whether public entities should be prosecuted criminally. The
United States has brought civil enforcement actions against major cities including
Atlanta, Detroit, and Los Angeles, but rarely has pursued criminal cases, even
when civil lawsuits do not result in compliance. 144
138 195 F.3d 823 (6th Cir. 1999).
139 See EPA, Enforcement & Compliance Assurance Accomplishments Report, at 18
(1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/Region4/ead/attachments/1999 accomplishments
_report.pdf (providing an overview of the prosecution).
140 Id.
141 195 F.3d at 825, 828.
142 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Pozsgai, 999 F.2d 719 (3rd Cir. 1993); United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir.
1992); see also Kathleen F. Brickey, Wetlands Reform and the Criminal Enforcement
Record: a Cautionary Tale, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 71, 72-74 (1998) (describing the
controversy that followed a successful wetlands prosecution).
143 See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 788-89 (2006) (describing
repeated warnings given to the defendant).
144 A notable exception was the prosecution of United States v. PRASA, where the
Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority pleaded guilty to multiple Clean Water Act
violations at its wastewater treatment facilities and paid $10 million in criminal and civil
fines, as well as injunctive relief. See Notice of Lodging of the Consent Decree Under the
Clean Water Act, 71 Fed. Reg. 38660 (July 7, 2006).
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Although wetlands cases present difficult jurisdictional issues, and prudential
concerns may counsel against prosecution of public entities, repetitive violations
generally warrant consideration for criminal enforcement. At some point, a facility
that repeatedly violates its permit, even if those violations are disclosed, arguably
is no more lawful than a facility that does not obtain a permit or lies about its
permit compliance. Moreover, continued non-compliance raises the same issues
for environmental protection and for fairness to law-abiding competitors that arise
when a facility operates outside the regulatory system. In this area, the government
would better deter violations if it prosecuted more aggressively. 1
45
V. CONCLUSION
While there was a dearth of environmental lawmaking over the past two
decades, the environmental crimes program has matured and taken on increased
significance in environmental enforcement efforts. Many of the concerns raised in
the 1980s and 1990s about the role of criminal enforcement under the
environmental laws have not materialized. To some extent, commentators may not
have considered criminal law concepts like the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the
rule of lenity. In addition, it was not possible to know prospectively how
prosecutorial discretion would be exercised under the environmental laws.
Broad prosecutorial discretion always creates a risk that the government will
charge violations that should not be criminal. That risk may be limited, however, if
it is possible to identify the factors that prosecutors should consider in exercising
their discretion. In the environmental context, prosecutors should focus on cases
where there is significant harm or risk of harm, deceptive conduct, facilities that
operate outside the regulatory system, and/or repetitive .violations. By doing so, a
well-integrated environmental crimes program is possible, even though criminal
enforcement of environmental violations raises challenging theoretical and
doctrinal issues.
145 The Obama administration has acknowledged the need for more vigorous
enforcement against chronic violators of the Clean Water Act. See Charles Duhigg, E.P.A.
Vows Better Effort on Water, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2009, at B 1.
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